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'The Hidden Point of Intersection' 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Sovereignty and Bio-politics in Foucault and Agamben 
Abstract 
 The relationship between sovereignty and bio-politics has been frequently discussed and 
debated in the literature sounding the work of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. A number 
of commentators firmly align themselves with Foucault, charging Agamben with some 
combination of ahistoricism and reductionism in his account of sovereignty. They see Foucault 
as not guilty of these sins, and therefore preferable. Many of these critiques, however, arise from 
conflating two separate levels of analysis: history and power. By holding apart these two 
domains, I will attempt to offer a qualified defense of Agamben and subsequently show that he 
and Foucault are not as irreconcilable as often presented. 
Framing the debate 
 Before attempting to bring Foucault and Agamben closer together, however, we must 
understand the debate that has led to so much distance being placed between them. The main 
issue at stake here is how the two theorists understand the relationship between sovereign power 
and bio-power. For Foucault, bio-power is central to the story he tells throughout his work, albeit 
in various ways, about the transition from the Classical Age to modernity. Unlike the epistemic 
shifts of his archaeological work, what is of concern for us here is a “profound transformation” 
of the “mechanisms of power” in the West.1 Up to this transition period, Foucault tells us that 
power relations primarily took the form of sovereign power: “essentially a right of seizure: of 
things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself.”2 Sovereign power is the power of the king to 
appropriate the property, labor, or lives of his subjects.  
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, Reissue edition (New 




 With the shift from the Classical Age to modernity, there is a shift from sovereign power 
to bio-power. Rather than individual subjects, bio-power takes “man-as-species,” or at least 
specific populations, as its object.3 It is concerned with regularizing the biological characteristics 
of a population; it attempts to control the variables that determine statistics like birth rate, death 
rate, life span, etc; it wants to regulate, manage, and administer the multiplicity of bodies that 
forms a population. As Foucault says in Society Must Be Defended, sovereign power is the power 
to let live and make die, whereas bio-power is the power to make live (in certain ways and 
forms) and let die.4 The emergence and increasing dominance of bio-power over sovereign 
power is a signal event of Foucauldian modernity. As the famous inversion of Aristotle from 
volume one of History of Sexuality goes, “modern man is an animal whose politics places his 
existence as a living being in question.”5 
 Of course, this dominance must be qualified: modernity is not just the triumphal march of 
bio-power. Bio-power does not simply replace sovereign power: the two forms, along with 
disciplinary power, become imbricated, entangled, co-determining. We would lose key parts of 
Foucault's account of modernity and the normalizing society if we simply reduced it to the rise of 
bio-power. Nonetheless, it is clear that Foucault's bio-power is a historically contingent 
phenomenon, emerging during the transition from the Classical Age to modernity, which played 
a key role in both the development of Western states with large populations and the rise of 
capitalism: the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital. 
 This brings us to Agamben's seminal work Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
in which he famously attempts to 'correct or at least, complete' Foucault's account of modern 
                                                 
3 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David 
Macey, Reprint edition (New York: Picador, 2003), 246–247. 
4 Ibid., 240–248. 
5 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 143. 
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politics.6 Agamben's completion starts with two distinctions he takes from the Greeks: zoē versus 
bios and oikos versus polis. Zoē refers to the form of life common to all living things, whereas 
bios refers to a form life specific to an individual or group. Agamben highlights that no modern 
European languages have retained this distinction: English, for example, just has the single word 
'life.' There is no distinction between the life that we share with squirrels and bacteria versus the 
life that we share as members of a political community or readers of an academic journal. 
Agamben's second distinction runs in parallel: oikos is concerned with managing a household 
and household economics, whereas the polis is concerned with developing the good life. 
Agamben tells us that, starting with Aristotle and the Greeks, the Western polis was founded by 
relegating zoē to the oikos. The oikos is concerned with the maintenance and reproduction of 
natural biological life, the polis is concerned with cultivating the bios of a community, and never 
the twain shall meet. This is why thinkers as varied as Foucault and Arendt have understood 
modernity as “the entrance of zoē into the sphere of the polis – the politicization of bare life as 
such.”7 
 Agamben's key thesis and intervention is to argue that, by constitutively excluding zoē, 
the polis actually includes natural life in its logic. This is what Agamben calls the inclusive 
exclusion, where an element is included solely by virtue of being excluded. He dovetails this 
with his understanding, which follows Carl Schmitt, of the sovereign decision: the moment of 
drawing the line between what is inside and what is outside, what is in the polis and what is in 
the oikos. Agamben's claim is that, since the Greeks, Western politics has been defined by its 
inclusive exclusion of natural life.8 For Agamben, then, modernity is not about the emergence of 
                                                 
6 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 1 edition 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998), 9. 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 Ibid., 1-12. 
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bio-power and the decline of sovereign power. Bio-power has always been implicated in 
sovereign power by the inclusive exclusion of natural life. Sovereignty is always already bio-
political. This is what Agamben refers to when he speaks of an 'originary bond' between 
sovereignty and bio-politics, and we are now in a position to understand one of Agamben's main 
theses: “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power;”9 or, 
alternately, “the production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty.”10 
 This is the crux of the debate between Foucault and Agamben around sovereign power 
and bio-power. We have, it would seem, two radically different and incompatible accounts. For 
Foucault, the increasing conflation of biology and politics is a distinctly modern phenomena. For 
Agamben, it is the making explicit of what has been implicit in Western politics since Aristotle; 
bio-politics is built into the structure of sovereignty. Is bio-power, with Foucault, historically 
contingent, emergent, and originally separate from sovereign power, even if the two have 
become entangled during modernity? Or, with Agamben, are sovereign power and bio-power the 
two sides of a coin which was minted with the relegation of zoē to the oikos? 
Historical phenomenon or model of power? 
 The first place to attempt to reconcile Foucault and Agamben is the question of models of 
power. Foucault's attempt to 'cut off the King's head' in political theory and reconceptualize 
power is well known. Foucault rejected a model of power based solely on sovereign or juridical 
power and chose instead to analyze power as a decentered network or chain of unstable, shifting 
relations that are coextensive with the social.11 This is surely one of his most important 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 6. 
10 Ibid., 83. 
11 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd Vintage ed (Vintage, 1995), 26–27; 
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, Reissue edition (New York: Vintage, 1990), 
92–94; Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, Reprint 
edition (New York: Picador, 2003), 29. 
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contributions to social and political thought. There is a reoccurring suggestion throughout the 
literature on Foucault and Agamben that the latter rejects this theoretical move by the former. 
Tom Frost writes: “To make his move from Foucault clear, Agamben characterizes Foucault as 
having moved away from juridical notions of power, juridical notions which Agamben 
(re)introduces into biopower.”12 Andrew Neal similarly argues that Agamben's project is open to 
Foucauldian criticisms because Agamben uses a model of power as sovereignty that Foucault 
convincingly rejected as inadequate.13 And Verena Erlenbusch, in an article on Foucault, 
Agamben, and Judith Butler writes, “Agamben believes that Foucault's account of power fails to 
acknowledge the fundamental importance of the traditional juridico-institutional model of 
sovereignty in the production of natural life itself.”14 We find the kernel of these critiques in 
Homo Sacer when Agamben writes that he is concerned with the “hidden point of intersection 
between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power.”15 But, it is key to point 
out that Foucault rejected sovereignty as a model for how power operated, not as a fundamental 
historical fact. Agamben may assert a greater historical role for sovereign power than Foucault 
does (more on this below), but this is not the same as advocating a return to sovereignty for the 
analysis of power. We must hold apart history and power as two separate levels of analysis.* The 
above commentators suggest that Agamben wants to give more historical importance to 
sovereignty, and therefore must want to return to sovereignty as the model for analyzing power. 
                                                 
12 Tom Frost, “Agamben’s Sovereign Legalization of Foucault,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30, no. 3 
(September 2010): 550. 
13 Andrew W. Neal, “Cutting Off the King’s Head: Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended and the Problem of 
Sovereignty,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 4 (August 1, 2004): 375. 
14 Verena Erlenbusch, “The Place of Sovereignty: Mapping Power with Agamben, Butler, and Foucault,” Critical 
Horizons 14, no. 1 (January 2013): 48, doi:10.1179/15685160X13A.0000000003. 
15 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 6. 
* Obviously history and power are inseparable in many ways. For the genealogist, the study of history is the study 
of shifting power relations; conversely, there is no hypostatized Power, no power that exists outside of history – 
the study of power relations is always historical. My contention is simply that some writers conflate Agamben's 
assertions about the importance and logic of a historical phenomenon (sovereignty) with claims about how we 
should analyze and conceptualize power. In this sense, history and power are separate levels of analysis. 
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The latter was foreclosed as an option by Foucault cutting off the King's head, and so Agamben's 
project is a dead end. This argument, however, does not appear to be valid. Can we not 
simultaneously accept a Foucualdian understanding of the analysis of power and Agamben's 
claims about the history and logic of sovereignty? 
Reconciling sovereign power, bio-power, and bio-politics 
 The next point of contention is whether or not Agamben reduces bio-power to 
sovereignty, and whether or not he reduces all power to sovereign power. Frost offers a fairly 
straightforward presentation of Foucault: “Biopower, disciplinary power and sovereign power 
manage to cover as large a surface of the population as possible, with all three forms of power 
exercising themselves over different areas of the population for different reasons in different 
ways.”16 Mika Ojakangas suggests that Agamben, on the other hand, considers it impossible to 
distinguish between sovereign power and bio-power.17 Michael Dillon contends that “Agamben 
engages in a nomological manoeuvre that conflates sovereign with biopower.”18 And Erlenbusch 
writes that, on Agamben's “account, the sovereign decision on the political inclusion of 
individuals by allowing for their execution eventually becomes the ultimate biopolitical gesture 
and biopolitics and sovereignty are indistinguishable, if not the same thing altogether.”19 There is 
a standard reading that presents Foucault as holding apart sovereign power and bio-power as 
fundamentally different forms of power with different rationalities, bio-power being historically 
contingent and emerging centuries after sovereign power, whereas Agamben collapses and 
identifies the two. This is close to how I summarized the two earlier; I am happy with this 
                                                 
16 Frost, “Agamben’s Sovereign Legalization of Foucault,” 566. 
17 Mika Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 2 (May 1, 
2005): 7. 
18 Michael Dillon, “Cared to Death: The Biopoliticised Time of Your Life,” Foucault Studies 0, no. 2 (August 7, 
2007): 38. 
19 Erlenbusch, “The Place of Sovereignty,” 49. 
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reading of Foucault, and there is a kernel of truth to its presentation of Agamben. As we saw, 
certainly one of the main theses of the first volume of Homo Sacer is that sovereign power, via 
the inclusive exclusion of natural life, is always already bio-political. 
 I want to suggest that this is not quite the same as equating sovereign power and bio-
power, however, and that there is space here for reconciling Foucault and Agamben. Ojakangas' 
intervention is ironically useful in this context, despite the fact that he rejects virtually every 
single one of Agamben's conclusions in favor of Foucault and suggests that a dialogue between 
Foucault and Agamben on bio-power is impossible.20 Ojakangas helpfully points out what at first 
appears to be an aporia or paradox. “Not bare life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of 
death, but the care of 'all living' is the foundation of bio-power.”21 In other words, Ojakangas 
contends that Agamben does not understand or misconstrues Foucauldian bio-power. Homo 
sacer, the category of Roman law from which Agamben takes his project's title, refers to life that 
can be killed without committing homicide but which cannot be sacrificed.22 This is bare life, 
inclusively excluded by sovereign power: it is part of the legal order insofar as it is an exception 
to the legal order – bare life can be killed without homicide taking place. Bio-power, on the other 
hand, is concerned with productively managing and administering the life of a population.23 Bare 
life, the life at issue for Agamben, does not seem to be bio-political. The object of bio-power is 
becoming, or life subject to the productive capacities of bio-power, not bare life that is to be 
killed.24 “Instead of bare life, the life of bio-power is a plenitude of life, as Foucault puts it.”25 
Agamben uses bare life to argue for an originary link between sovereign power and bio-power, 
                                                 
20 Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power,” 5. 
21 Ibid., 6. 
22 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 71–74. 
23 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 139–143. 
24 Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power,” 11–13. 
25 Ibid., 13–14. 
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but it is not clear if bare life is actually bio-political. 
 Rather than precluding the possibility of dialogue between Foucault and Agamben, this 
contradiction identified by Ojakangas allows us to bring them closer together. First, I think we 
can reasonably break with Ojakangas' strict understanding of sovereign power as a power of 
deduction (i.e., subtraction of wealth, labor, or life from subjects) and bio-power as a power of 
production.26 We can understand bare life as bio-political in that it represents “the politicization 
of life,” to borrow a phrase from Johanna Oksala.27 This is the main thrust of Agamben's 
argument in Homo Sacer: via the inclusive exclusion, biological life is always already political. 
Hence, sovereign power is bio-political. I want to provisionally suggest a distinction between 
'bio-politics' and 'bio-power', one that is not in Foucault or Agamben but one that I think is 
productive. 'Bio-political' implies the politicization of life, which Agamben argues is always 
already a part of the sovereign decision and the history of sovereign power. We can use 'bio-
power', on the other hand, to refer to a specific deployment of power relations which emerged in 
the eighteenth century and which was carefully analyzed by Foucault.* This distinction between 
bio-politics and bio-power accomplishes two main goals. First, Ojakangas' contradiction is 
resolved. Bare life may not be the object of bio-power, understood as the productive 
administration of a population, but it is bio-political. Second, it clears the way to defend 
Agamben from charges of reductionism, to which we can turn now. 
 Many of the aforementioned commentators criticize Agamben for being reductionist or 
ahistorical. Neal is perhaps the most damning in this regard.28 He argues that, “[a]though useful 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 6. 
27 Johanna Oksala, Foucault, Politics, and Violence (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 86. 
* Foucault certainly uses 'bio-politics' to refer to what I am provisionally calling 'bio-power.' The distinction I am 
trying to make is not based on a careful exegesis of how Foucault or Agamben use 'bio-power' versus 'bio-
politics,' and two other terms might be better suited for the phenomena I am attempting to differentiate. 
28 See, e.g., Neal, “Cutting Off the King’s Head,” 375; and ibid., 392–395. 
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and analytically precise, Agamben poses the problem of sovereignty in rather apolitical and 
entirely juridico-philosophical terms, thus emptying out the extremely complex principle and 
practice that is sovereignty.”29 More pithily, Neal insists that “sovereignty is far more than a legal 
puzzle.”30 Erlenbusch contends that Agamben reductively sees all of Western politics as being 
“structured by a logic of sovereignty”31 and that, while compelling in many ways, Agamben's 
“analysis of modern power is nevertheless a problematic generalization.”32 Oksala comes down 
in favor of Foucault because he always historicizes, and does not make sweeping onto-political 
claims such as Agamben's about sovereignty. 33 Again, I suggest that these critiques arise from 
misconstruing Agamben's project and not holding apart different levels of analysis. Agamben is 
concerned with the paradox of sovereignty – the logics of the state of exception, the relation of 
ban, and the inclusive exclusion. There is nothing in this project that requires us to read every 
phenomena in Western history through this lens, or to say that sovereign power has remained 
unchanged since it emerged with the Greek polis. Indeed, Agamben does trace significant 
changes in the structure of sovereignty and bio-power throughout volume one of Homo Sacer. 
Modern bio-power is certainly not the same as ancient bio-politics, and Agamben locates a more 
recent break between Nazi bio-power and the even more radical bio-power stemming from 
advances in the life sciences that have occurred in the second half of the twentieth century.34 
Despite the worries of some writers, Agamben's originary link between sovereign power and bio-
politics does not foreclose all possibilities of historical specificity. 
 Furthermore, and here I may depart significantly from Agamben, I do not see any reason 
                                                 
29 Neal, “Cutting Off the King’s Head,” 375. 
30 Ibid., 395. 
31 Erlenbusch, “The Place of Sovereignty,” 46. 
32 Ibid., 50. 
33 Oksala, Foucault, Politics, and Violence, 100–101. 
34 See, e.g., his discussion of the bio-politics of modern democracies and constitutional rights on Agamben, Homo 
Sacer, 126–135; his analysis of the characteristics of Nazi bio-politics on ibid., 147–148; and his discussion of 
new categories of coma and redefininmg the lines between life and death on ibid., 160–165. 
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why we cannot accept his thesis of an originary link between sovereignty and bio-politics and 
simultaneously posit the existence of other forms of power (e.g. pastoral, disciplinary, or a 
distinctly modern bio-power) a la Foucault. Bio-political sovereignty might indeed be the most 
decisive form of power in Western society, but that does not imply that no other forms of power 
can exist or have any impact whatsoever. To borrow a phrase from Marx, there may well be 
countervailing tendencies that act on Agamben's bio-political sovereignty. I agree with 
Foucauldian theorists who are wary of reducing the history of Western power to sovereignty, but 
I do not think that Agamben's project actually requires us to do so. 
Conclusion 
 Contrary to a lot of debate surrounding Foucault and Agamben, I do not see them as 
hopelessly at odds. The main strand of Agamben's argument in Homo Sacer operates at logical 
and philosophical level, dealing with the reciprocal implication between the structure of 
sovereignty and homo sacer. I find nothing in his insights about sovereign power that require us 
to return to sovereignty as the model for doing historical research about power relations, or to 
read all of Western history as emanating from sovereignty. I hope to have shown that, with 
Agamben, we can understand sovereignty as being always already bio-political, while 
simultaneously understanding, with Foucault, modern bio-power as a contingent historical 
phenomenon among other forms of power. In this way, there would seem to be ample room for 
productive dialogue between Foucault's insights on the analysis of power and the histories of 
various forms of power in the West, and Agamben's theses on the structure of sovereignty. 
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